The Falklands War, following the Argentine military occupation of disputed British territory in the South Atlantic, involved the biggest British naval deployment since WW2, lasted 74 days and cost the lives 649 Argentine military personnel, 255 British military personnel, and three Falkland Islanders . It ended in British victory, the collapse of Argentina’s military regime, and contributed to Mrs Thatcher’s reelection as prime-minister.
To a new generation of young European adults, the Falklands War not only barely features in their collective memory, but is largely ignored as a subject worth studying at school or university. Compared to the inherited consciousness passed down by parents and grandparents of two World Wars, and the more recent experience of conflicts related to the War on and by Terrorism, the Falklands struggles to secure a place in the collective memory, let alone current awareness.
Only in Argentina, and on the islands themselves, and in some British regiments-does the war fought in 1982, continue to impact on a broad civilian as well as military consciousness, with the dead commemorated in monuments and museums, veterans digging up stories and relics from the campaign, and an argument over its consequences a subject of continuing serious political discourse.
And yet as a two day conference I attended in Manchester, England, last week showed the Falklands War is a subject that continues to fuel discussion among a relatively small number of academics, and rather more individuals that were directly involved at the time, not least (now retired) members of the British military, journalists, and Falkland islanders who experienced it at first hand.
The aim of the conference organisers was in part to test the suggestion that the Falklands War was an accident of history, of little relevance to the pressing political concerns and military challenges of the 21st century, an anachronistic last hurrah of a once imperial Britain, on the one hand and a decadent Latin American military dictatorship, that were a drawn into a war neither of them really ever dreamed of having over some distant islands most people outside Argentina had scarcely heard about, let alone cared about prior to 1982.
Those who contributed to the conference tried their best to convey a sense of why the Falklands war mattered, that there were lessons worth learning, while struggling to agree on what was its more enduring legacy.
One of the few Argentines present , the Cambridge University academic Guillermo Makim focused on his well-known thesis that the war might have been avoided or at least a more enduring resolution found after it, if only the British had accepted proposals for a leaseback deal, satisfying Argentine claims but against the wishes of the islanders. I couldn’t help he was thrashing a dead horse with British politicians long ago having lost interest in Argentina and currently occupied on other more pressing issues of sovereignty and most islanders resolute in not losing their British status .
Other academics were on hand to share their research-little of it earth shattering, let alone game changing- that ranged from the politics of oil and UK/US diplomacy when Haig was US Secretary of state to well aired accounts of propaganda, and national identity when it came to Falklands/Malvinas.
Unsurprisingly it was the military veterans and island representatives that drew the greatest attention , with detailed personal reminiscences and heart-felt insights about the war and its aftermath.
There was a fascinating account by retired Major Mike Seear of the debilitating psychological impact on the Argentine troops of false rumours that spread about the Gurkhas use of their fabled kukri knives.
And you certainly also couldn’t hear a pin drop in the lecture hall as former Falklands marine commander Major General Julian Thompson described the organisation and leadership of Britain’s boldest military exercise since WW2 –full of improvisation, good luck ,and no small measure of valour and professionalism. And yet it was hard not to take into account the outspoken Falklands hero’s most recent public contribution to national politics by his vocal support for an uncompromising Brexit as serving Britain’s best defence interests. Both the Falklands War and Brexit seemed to be part of the same minted coin, a piece of post imperial bravado defying reason.
There was certainly more than a touch of irony that a Falklands Island politician who spoke after him , while showing her gratitude for the way the British military liberated them from Argentine occupation, and focusing on how much the islands had managed to prosper as a result of the British military victory, challenged an academic for generalising that Falklands islanders were united by their English ancestry.
She was, she pointed out herself, born in Punta Arenas, the daughter of a Chilean, and islanders drew their ancestry from a number of nations. And off script and in the corridor of the conference of the hall she shared her fear that having the UK crash out of Europe could negatively impact on the islands’ economy. Not only was the EU market an important destination for Falkland exports, notably loligo squid, but the British overseas territory has been a recipient of a supportive European development Fund.
The dreaded B word was of course not on the conference agenda, and the contradictions emerging from the platform were stumbled on rather than planned, and did not go without challenge.
No-one thankfully wasted much time in resurrecting the old canard that the sinking of the Belgrano was the biggest cover-up in British military history. But the chilling account by the navigating officer of HMS Conqueror of the British submarine’s voyage to the South Atlantic and choice of torpedoes for the kill of the Argentine battle ship was both fascinating and disconcerting both for its insight into the British tensions and dangers on board, and a reminder of the death of the 323 people who died, mainly young Argentine sea cadets, with half-naked survivors struggling in freezing temperatures while swimming to a life craft.Such is war.
Thankfully the navy man had the courtesy not to refer to dead floating Argentines as ‘Erics’ (sic) ,a term invoked by another speaker who had not fought in the war, and had no academic qualification but who still presented himself as a leading Falklands War historian while unashamedly promoting his book as the definitive account of the resistance put up by British marines on the first day of the invasion.
This speaker found himself upsetting several other delegates including the war’s honoured official historian Sir Lawrence Freedman who challenged his claims of exclusivity, failing to provide supportive evidence, and simply making factual errors.
Indeed Professor Freedman doubted whether as the 40th anniversary approached in 2022 there was anything substantially new to be revealed about the war that had not already been written or that might change our perception of it .
However he did concede that serious and respectable journalists reporting history as it happened not as myth should be listened to more carefully by academics because of their front-line experience and access to valuable sources and information.
